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Corporate Response to Distress: 
Evidence from the Asian Financial Crisis
Rajdeep Sengupta and Mara Faccio 
This paper provides a comprehensive examination of corporate responses to financial distress
during an economy-wide crisis, specifically through the restructuring of assets (through asset sales,
mergers, or liquidations) and/or liabilities. Using firm-level data from five countries hardest hit
by the East Asian financial crisis of 1997-98, this study contrasts the effects that financial and
corporate governance variables have on restructuring choices. The study finds that, during a crisis,
financial constraints and corporate governance each have a large effect on restructuring choices.
(JEL G33, G34)
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economic growth, but also can significantly fore-
stall innovation and entrepreneurship. Typically,
deleveraging involves creditor workouts and/or
asset sales. In the former, a firm renegotiates
repayment of its obligations; in the latter, a firm
uses the proceeds from divestiture to repay debt.
Firms often use multiple means to successfully
reduce financial distress. 
We use company-level data from the East
Asian crisis of 1997-98 to study the deleveraging
process and the determinants of corporate
responses to distress. This example is relevant
for several reasons. First, it allows us to study a
large sample of distressed firms in different coun-
tries affected by the crisis. Second, as elaborated
below, it allows us to study both the financial and
nonfinancial determinants of corporate responses.
Third, with the benefit of hindsight, it allows us
to study firms that have experienced significant
financial distress (both economy-wide and firm-
level) followed by a strong recovery. Such success
is in contrast to the experience of some countries
recurrently affected by crises, especially those




inancial crises are widely believed to have
long-lasting effects. Typically, recovery
involves deleveraging from significant
increases in debt incurred during the buildup to
the crisis. On the one hand, widespread defaults
on household debt may be at center stage of such
crises, as in the ongoing financial crisis in the
United States. On the other hand, as Reinhart
and Rogoff (2009, p. 251) point out, “it may be
worthwhile to consider widespread corporate
default as yet another variety of crisis.” Such
crises manifest as large-scale corporate defaults,
as happened during the East Asian financial
crisis of 1997-98. This paper studies corporate
responses to economy-wide and firm-level dis-
tress, specifically efforts to restructure (delever-
age) in the aftermath of a financial crisis. 
Understanding the determinants of firms’
responses in the wake of a financial crisis is impor-
tant for reducing the costs of a financial crisis.
Deleveraging can be a costly, laborious process
by which firms repay or draw down debt. It not
only has adverse effects on employment and
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meet its debt repayment obligations using its liq-
uid assets. Unless its performance recovers, the
distressed firm is likely to default on its debt,
which could lead to a formal bankruptcy filing,
a dismissal of management personnel, and possi-
bly liquidation of the firm (e.g., see Gilson, 1989).
To avoid such actions, firms typically respond by
restructuring their assets (by fire sales, mergers,
acquisitions, or capital-expenditure reductions),
liabilities (by restructuring bank loans or public
debt and through injections of new capital from
outside sources), or both. Although corporate
responses to economy-wide and firm-level dis-
tress are essentially the same, it is possible that
the determinants of these responses differ under
the two conditions. 
Although firms have several restructuring
options, most of the literature on firms in distress
has focused on a given type of response to distress
(and the costs thereof), primarily for U.S. firms.1
We could find only two exceptions. The first is a
paper by Asquith, Gertner, and Scharfstein (1994)
in which the authors provide a comprehensive
analysis of several different forms of financial
restructuring. They find that the structure of a
firm’s liabilities is the most important determi-
nant of its response to financial distress, while
performance-related variables have no explana-
tory power. Their paper focuses on corporate
responses under firm-level rather than economy-
wide financial distress. The second exception is
a recent paper by Atanassov and Kim (2006).
They take a broader approach—across several
countries—and look at the determinants of asset
sales, layoffs, and managerial turnover in response
to firm-specific distress. Their study focuses pri-
marily on regulatory variables; they argue that
the restructuring option chosen depends largely
on the degree of investor protection and labor
laws in a given country.
Despite the macroeconomic implications of
an economy-wide financial crisis, we know of
no comprehensive study that explores the specific
ways firms—including U.S. firms—try to avoid
liquidation during an economic downturn. This
is an important distinction between our paper
and other related work on corporate restructuring
under financial distress.2 In particular, we focus
on the aftermath of the East Asian crisis of 1997-
98 in the economies of Indonesia, Malaysia, the
Philippines, South Korea, and Thailand. These
five countries are widely believed to be those
most affected by that crisis (Radelet and Sachs,
1998). This particular focus allows us not only
to study corporate responses when all companies
face an economy-wide crisis but also to compile
and compare the determinants of corporate
responses for companies that face firm-level dis-
tress during a period of economy-wide distress. 
An important distinction of this study is that
we contrast two sets of determinants of corporate
responses to financial distress: (i) governance
variables and (ii) capital structure and perform-
ance variables. We specifically investigate the
role of business groups and family ownership,
which represent the prevalent form of corporate
control outside Anglo-Saxon systems. In East
Asia, most large firms are closely held conglomer-
ates—structured as business groups—as opposed
to the widely held corporations that prevail in
the United States and United Kingdom (La Porta,
Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer, 1999; and
Claessens, Djankov, and Lang, 2000). Given that
during our study period the control of corporate
assets was concentrated in the hands of a few
wealthy families (organized as groups), it would
be instructive to know whether group affiliation
and ownership type played any role in the reso-
lution of the financial distress of these firms. For
example, earlier work by Lang, Poulsen, and Stulz
(1995) shows that, absent financial distress,
entrenched U.S. managers engage in suboptimal
divestiture decisions when such practice allows
them to pursue their personal goals. More recently,
Faccio, Masulis, and McConnell (2006) show that
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1 This literature includes work by Brown, James, and Mooradian
(1993) on public debt and bank debt restructurings; Gilson (1990)
on bank debt restructurings; Brown, James, and Mooradian (1994)
on asset sales; Erwin and McConnell (1997) on piecemeal voluntary
liquidations; Tashjian, Lease, and McConnell (1996) on prepack-
aged bankruptcies; and Ang, Chua, and McConnell (1982), Franks
and Torous (1989), and Hotchkiss (1994) on bankruptcy filings.
2 In work related to but different from ours, Claessens, Djankov,
and Klapper (2003) analyze the likelihood of formal (versus infor-
mal) bankruptcy filings during the East Asian crisis. They find that
bankruptcy filings are less common for bank-owned and group-
affiliated firms.politically connected (typically family) firms are
especially likely to receive a bailout from their
home government during a crisis.
An important consideration in the resolution
of distress involves the negotiations between the
distressed firm and its creditors. Banks are often
part of business groups and known to give firms
affiliated with the group, particularly firms in dis-
tress, preferential access to capital. This is partly
because group affiliation lessens capital-market
frictions.3 This makes bank-led creditor workouts
easier for group-affiliated firms.4 Moreover, con-
glomerates often provide sufficient cross guaran-
tees to bail out troubled members within their
group.5 Group affiliation therefore dilutes the
information available to an outside creditor. In a
crisis situation, this opacity may help group-
affiliated firms by creating a greater likelihood of
creditor bailouts. Kim (2004) specifically argues
that conglomeration is a device designed by firms
to maximize the chance of bailout in the event of
a default on their bank loans. His model demon-
strates that a bank has more difficulty inferring
the quality of members within a business group
than that of stand-alone firms because intergroup
loan guarantees prevent a bank from knowing
whether a payment is from the borrower or from
other firms in the group. Consequently, the bank
is more likely to liquidate a freestanding firm
than an otherwise identical group-affiliated firm.
Our study provides an opportunity to determine
whether this theoretical hypothesis holds true in
practice.
Regarding capital structure, it is known that
debt has been the primary source of external
financing in East Asia and that some corporations
were highly leveraged. In a world of unavoidable
bankruptcy costs, the characteristics of a firm’s
capital structure influence the likelihood of bank-
ruptcy and the magnitude of the costs incurred
(Senbet and Seward, 1995). An additional feature
of Asian economies is that firms had incentives
to delay debt, operational restructuring, and even
repayment of loans because of weak foreclosure
and bankruptcy laws in their given countries.
Bankruptcy reforms were necessary not only to
ensure actual firm failures but also to enable
creditors and debtors to reach out-of-court settle-
ments (see Claessens, Djankov, and Mody, 2001,
for details). 
We examine financial responses to economy-
wide distress for 622 firms from the five Asian
countries most severely affected by the East Asian
financial crisis of 1997-98. The responses were
recorded over a six-year period from 1998 to 2003.
Of the total responses, restructuring liabilities
through creditor workouts emerges as firms’ most-
favored response (21.86 percent), followed by
asset sales (14.63 percent), which include the
selling of divisions and the reduction of property,
plant, and equipment holdings. Mergers and
acquisitions are third (3.9 percent). Only 10 firms
in our sample were liquidated over the sample
period.
We use duration analysis to examine the
determinants of three responses to distress: 
(i) asset sales, (ii) creditor workouts, and (iii)
mergers and acquisitions. In particular, we adopt
a stratified Cox relative risk hazard model using
time-varying covariates to determine the hazard
of each response. There are several advantages to
adopting this framework for our regression analy-
sis. First, unlike more commonly used discrete-
outcome models, hazard models use data more
efficiently by explicitly incorporating information
about the timing of alternative responses. Second,
this framework allows a firm to have multiple
responses, even within the same year, as seen in
the data. Third, this method allows covariates,
especially financial variables, to vary with time.
Fourth, our estimation procedure allows us to
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3 The literature on relationship banking documents that asymmet-
ric information problems make it difficult for a firm to initiate a
lending relationship with a bank while hold-up problems make it
difficult for firms to switch banks. Such problems are mitigated if
both the bank and firm are part of the same conglomerate.
4 Morck, Wolfenzon, and Yeung (2005) argue that pyramid firms
can also enjoy cheaper access to capital than freestanding firms
even when banks are not part of the pyramid group. This could
occur either because apex firms of the group can serve as banks or
because the superior bargaining power of such conglomerations
reduces rent-seeking by outside banks. 
5 Friedman, Johnson, and Mitton (2002) record instances of control-
ling shareholders propping up distressed firms in their group (to
the benefit of public shareholders) to attract external financing.
While Hoshi, Kashyap, and Scharfstein (1991) view such interfirm
transfers as enhancing economic efficiency by reducing bankruptcy
costs, Morck and Nakamura (1999) present evidence that such
transactions also include bailouts of inefficient firms.check for robustness using data conditional on
firm-level distress. In addition, stratifying our
sample by country allows us to control for coun-
trywide differences in institutions (i.e., the rules,
practices, and organizations that govern the
economy).
Our results are as follows. We find that finan-
cial and governance variables influence the
response hazard but their influence varies with
each response. The creditor workout hazard
decreases with increases in the proportion of
intangible assets or the interest coverage ratio.
The asset sale hazard increases with firm size,
while the merger hazard increases with a firm’s
earning potential (return on equity [ROE]). In
addition, the asset sale hazard decreases but the
merger hazard increases with higher concentra-
tions of ownership. However, both effects are
largely attributable to large blockholders not
involved with management. Finally, political
connections and group affiliation each increase
the hazard ratios for all three responses. Not  ably,
group affiliation has the largest effect on the
merger hazard. Moreover, group affiliation
increases the hazard of creditor workouts, which
supports the theory of conglomeration advanced
in Kim (2004). 
DATA SOURCES AND 
DEFINITIONS OF VARIABLES 
Financial Data and Corporate Distress
This paper uses firm-level data for the five
countries most severely affected by the East Asian
financial crisis of 1997-98: Indonesia, Malaysia,
the Philippines, South Korea, and Thailand. Firms
in these countries were selected on the basis of
three criteria. First, the financial data for each
firm had to be reported in the Worldscope data-
base, which is the primary source for accounting
data. Unless otherwise noted, we use company
financial reports from the Worldscope database
between 1993 and 2002. Second, each firm had
to be included in the ownership dataset compiled
by Claessens, Djankov, and Lang (2000) (further
detailed below). Third, the primary business
segment of each firm could not be in financial
services—that is, not in the Standard Industrial
Classification (SIC) 6000-6999. Excluding all
unleveraged companies, the final sample consists
of 622 firms. In general, the sample is represen-
tative of larger firms that trade on the major stock
exchanges in each country. 
Using firm-level financial data, we classify a
firm as “financially distressed”6 if the company
had any year with (i) earnings before interest and
taxes (EBIT) less than its reported interest expense
or (ii) operating income less than its reported
interest expense.7 Accordingly, we define a
dummy variable at the firm level, distress, that
takes the value 1 if for any year either of these
two conditions is satisfied. Using this definition,
458 of 622 firms are classified as distressed. 
At first glance, it appears that such a strong
selection condition could impose a bias in our
sample selection and classify most of the firms
in our sample as distressed. However, it is impor-
tant to understand that, while our criterion for
classification captures a firm’s inability to make
its interest payments for a given year, it does not
include criteria that would measure its potential
to pay down its stock of debt. This becomes rele-
vant when comparing distressed versus nondis-
tressed firms because distressed firms appear to
be highly leveraged. Table 1 shows that both meas-
ures of leverage—the debt-to-asset ratio and the
debt-to-equity ratio—are significantly higher for
distressed firms. The debt-to-asset ratio is the ratio
of a firm’s total liabilities to its total assets, and
the debt-to-equity ratio is the ratio of a firm’s total
liabilities to its common equity. That distressed
firms are more highly leveraged can be viewed
as reaffirmation of the distinction between dis-
tressed and nondistressed firms. 
Following the abundant literature on
responses to financial distress, we list the finan-
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130 MARCH/APRIL 2011 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS REVIEW
6 Any measure of distress would need to use a financial metric and
is likely to be arbitrary. However, this distinction at the firm level
is largely to select a subset of firms to make a distinction between
economy-wide distress and firm-level distress. As our robustness
check results reveal later, the distinction does not appear to be
important in our sample.
7 Operating income is the difference between operating revenues
and operating expenses, as opposed to nonoperating income, which
is attributed to the portion of an organization’s income that is
derived from activities not related to its core operations. EBIT is
the sum of an organization’s operating and nonoperating income.cial variables (ratios) deemed important determi-
nants of responses to distress. A significant indi-
cator of distress is the interest coverage ratio
(Asquith, Gertner, and Scharfstein, 1994). It is
computed as EBIT divided by the total interest
payable. The interest coverage ratio is a measure
of a company’s ability to honor its debt payments.8
In addition, Brown, James, and Mooradian (1994)
show that performance is the most important
predictor of bankruptcy and reorganization. As a
proxy for the company’s accounting performance,
Sengupta and Faccio
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Table 1
Firm Summary Statistics 
Variables All firms Distressed firms Nondistressed firms
Number of firms 622 458 164
Firm size (USD thousands) Mean 1,105.39 1,163.78 373.53
Median 239.50 247.11 168.33
Debt-to-asset ratio Mean 0.68 0.71 0.33
Median 0.62 0.64 0.32
Debt-to-equity ratio Mean 6.45 6.91 0.71
Median 1.30 1.44 0.47
Group affiliation Percent 59.00 62.01 50.61
Political connection Percent 13.34 11.14 19.51
Management ownership Percent 66.72 63.74 75.00
Pyramid ownership Percent 32.79 35.16 26.22
Firms in group Mean 9.70 9.15 11.76
Median 88 9
Banks in group Mean 2.65 2.59 2.88
Median 22 2
Largest blockholder ownership Mean 27.40 26.21 31.15
Median 23.53 21.57 27.93
NOTE: A firm is classified as financially distressed if for any year between 1998 and 2002 the company had earnings before EBIT or
operating income less than its reported interest expense. Firm size is the log of a firm’s total assets measured in thousands of U.S.
dollars (USD). The debt-to-asset ratio is a firm’s total liabilities divided by its total assets. The debt-to-equity ratio is a firm’s total lia-
bilities divided by its total common equity. These three financial variables are calculated for all financial years between 1998 and 2002.
The dummy variable group affiliation indicates whether a company is part of a major business group (Claessens, Djankov, and Lang,
2000). Political connection indicates that at least one of a firm’s top directors (CEO, president, vice president, or secretary) or large
shareholders (any blockholder controlling at least 10 percent of shareholder votes) is a member of parliament, a government minister,
or closely related to a top politician or party official (Faccio, Masulis, and McConnell, 2006). The dummy variable management owner-
ship takes the value 1 if a firm’s CEO or board chairman or vice chairman is part of the controlling ownership and 0 otherwise (Claessens,
Djankov, and Lang, 2000). The dummy variable pyramid ownership takes the value 1 if the firm is controlled through a pyramid struc-
ture (Claessens, Djankov, and Lang, 2000). Firms in group is the total number of firms in a group (to which a firm is affiliated) when
group affiliation = 1. Banks in group is the total number of banks and financial companies in a group (to which a firm is affiliated) when
group affiliation = 1. Largest blockholder ownership is the holdings percentage of the largest shareholder.
8 Notably, we have used the interest coverage ratio both as a deter-
minant of responses and as a selection criterion for firm-level
distress, which undoubtedly raises some obvious concerns about
selection bias. However, it is important to mention that our estima-
tion procedure extends to all firms and not just those in distress.
The selection bias assumes importance when we repeat our esti-
mation for companies that experience firm-level distress as a check
for robustness of our results.we use a standard financial ratio, ROE. We also
control for market expectations of recovery
through the variable market value/book ratio (MB
ratio), which is the market value of equity (ordi-
nary and preferred) plus the book value of total
debt divided by the book value of total assets
(Gilson, Kose, and Lang, 1990; and Asquith,
Gertner, and Scharfstein, 1994). The book value
of total assets is the sum of total current assets,
long-term receivables, investments in unconsoli-
dated subsidiaries, other investments, net prop-
erty, plants, equipment, and other assets. Finally,
we also include the variable firm size, which is
the log of the company’s market capital or total
assets measured in thousands of U.S. dollars
(USD). We include this variable because (i) the
choice for a workout is likely to depend on a
company’s size and its borrowing capability and
(ii) it is widely believed that larger firms have
better access to credit markets even when they
are constrained (Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and
Maksimovic, 2008).
Lastly, we include an additional variable, the
intangible assets ratio. Gilson, John, and Lang
(1990, p. 323) argue that “creditor consent is
harder to obtain when there is greater asymmetry
in the information used by the stockholders and
creditors to value the firm.” They also point out
that the information asymmetry regarding the
value of the firm increases with the proportion
of intangible assets because such assets, by their
nature, are difficult to value. Therefore, a greater
proportion of intangible assets relative to total
assets is likely to reduce the willingness of credi-
tors to enter into debt restructuring with the firm.
For this reason, we hypothesize that the intangi-
ble asset ratio is an important determinant of
creditor workouts. 
Event Data 
As mentioned earlier, both economy-wide
distress and firm-level distress can lead firms to
make similar responses. We consider only the
financial responses listed below and denote these
as “events” and “responses” interchangeably.
Event data collected for each firm are from the
publicly available Asia Pacific News Archives of
the Troubled Company Reporter (TCR) on the
website of the InterNet Bankruptcy Library (IBL).9
The TCR reports information related to the finan-
cial distress of publicly traded companies world-
wide, including regulatory filings, court pleadings,
judicial rulings, and press reports. The event data
cover the period February 1, 1998 (the date the
TCR starts covering distress), to December 31,
2003. The financial responses are classified as
(i) creditor workouts, also known as debt restruc-
turing, (ii) asset sales, which include property
sales and sales of divisions, (iii) mergers, and
(iv) liquidations. In each case, the date (year) of
the event is also noted. 
We define creditor workouts as agreements
between a firm and its creditors to modify any
terms of outstanding financial claims (either
public or private) currently held against the firm.
Common workout methods include one or more
of the following: an exchange offer (debt for
equity), covenant modification, maturity exten-
sion, or interest rate adjustment. The creditor
workouts category also includes injections of capi-
tal by creditors.10 In fact, the TCR news archives
reveal that workouts were often packaged to
include a combination of rescheduling, debt-
equity swaps, and capital injections by creditors.
Also, creditor workouts are the most prevalent
event in our sample: 136 companies (21.86 per-
cent) used creditor workouts to successfully
restructure their liabilities during the sample
period.
Firms also use asset sales to resolve financial
distress. Brown, James, and Mooradian (1994)
point out that distressed firms primarily use asset
sales because of pressure from creditors, often to
the detriment of stockholders.11 In particular, they
argue that the probability that asset sales are used
to repay debt increases with a firm’s leverage
and decreases with its operating performance.
They also find that firms using asset sales have
this distinguishing characteristic: They operate
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132 MARCH/APRIL 2011 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS REVIEW
9 The TCR lists data by date; see
www.bankrupt.com/TCRAP_Public/index.html.
10 Some authors, such as Senbet and Seward (1995), have treated
capital injections by creditors as a separate category.
11 However, Lang, Poulsen, and Stulz (1995) find that asset sales
used to retire debt result in an abnormally high (positive) average
stock return compared with sales proceeds retained by the firm.multiple divisions and subsidiaries. As a result,
diversified groups are more likely than freestand-
ing firms to use asset sales. Moreover, managers
that respond favorably to creditor pressure to
undertake asset sales are more likely to retain
control of the firm. We find that 91 distressed
firms in our sample (14.63 percent) sold part or
all of their assets.
In addition, 24 firms (3.9 percent) either
merged with another company or were acquired.
Only 10 firms were liquidated. This may be largely
because our sample includes mostly larger firms
with better access to capital markets. However,
there is an additional reason for the fewer liqui-
dations: Forbearance by creditors is often more
likely during an economic crisis (Peek and
Rosengreen, 2003). Naturally, a firm exits our
sample if it undergoes a merger, liquidation, or
both. The appendix includes articles from the
TCR archive for each noted financial response.
Governance Variables
In addition to financial and response variables,
this study includes another set of determinants
of financial responses—governance factors. We
specifically investigate the role of business groups,
political connections, and ownership concentra-
tion (the prevalent form of corporate control out-
side Anglo-Saxon systems). For business group
affiliation, we use data from Claessens, Djankov,
and Lang (2000), who compile several data
sources to identify whether a company is part of
a major business group. Following their paper,
group affiliation is a dummy variable that takes
the value 1 for all companies that are a part of a
business group and 0 otherwise. We use the group
affiliation variable to study the effect of group
affiliation on each response to corporate distress.
As mentioned before, Kim (2004) predicts a higher
likelihood of a debt workout for group-affiliated
than stand-alone firms.
Earlier work by Faccio, Masulis, and
McConnell (2006) shows that many Asian firms
were owned by key politicians (or people close
to them) and frequently received government aid
during the crisis. Therefore, we control for a given
company having political ties. Following their
paper, political connection is a dummy variable
that takes the value 1 if at least one of a firm’s top
directors (CEO, president, vice president, or
secretary) or large shareholders (any blockholder
controlling at least 10 percent of votes) is a mem-
ber of parliament, a government minister, or
closely related to a top politician or party and 0
otherwise. If these companies receive indirect
aid from the government, we would expect not
only a higher incidence of workouts, but also
more-frequent asset sales (particularly if politi-
cians can exert pressure on prospective buyers).12
Finally, we include two variables to study
measures of ownership concentration largely fol-
lowing Claessens, Djankov, and Lang (2000) and
Mitton (2002), respectively. The first variable is
largest blockholder ownership, defined as the
ownership percentage (in terms of cash flow
rights) of the largest shareholder in the firm. The
second variable is summed ownership concen-
tration, defined as the total holding of all share-
holders that own 5 percent or more stock, which
identifies when ownership is not concentrated
with an individual but with a group. To differen-
tiate between ownership blocks held by those
involved in management and those held by oth-
ers, Mitton (2002) uses largest management
blockholder concentration and largest nonman-
agement blockholder concentration. We also use
these governance measures to explain the differ-
ences in the modes of each response. 
SUMMARY STATISTICS
Tables 1 to 4 report summary statistics. We
use annual financial data from 1998 through 2003
to calculate financial variables for each firm over
all years for which data are available. In contrast,
we calculate governance and ownership variables
using pre-crisis data and treat these variables as
time invariant due to data limitations.13 These
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12 We refine some of these variables further to distinguish between
the types of controlling shareholders (for example, families or
governments) and determine whether a firm is part of a group that
includes a bank. However, these variables do not explain the like-
lihood of any of the responses.
13 For the observation dates for the governance and ownership data,
see the sources in Claessens, Djankov, and Lang (2000); Mitton
(2002); and Faccio, Masulis, and McConnell (2006).statistics are calculated across all firms as opposed
to all firm-years.
Table 1 shows how firms in distress differ
from their nondistressed peers. Our sample
includes 622 firms: 458 classified as distressed
(according to our definition) and 164 that failed
to enter distress at any point during our sample
period. As evident from Table 1, distressed firms
tend to be much larger in size—measured in terms
of total assets in USD. Not surprisingly, they also
tend to be more highly leveraged. On average, a
greater proportion of distressed firms are affiliated
with business groups or have pyramid ownership.
Conversely, a smaller proportion of distressed
firms have a political connection or management
ownership. Distressed firms with a group affilia-
tion have, on average, fewer firms and banks in
those groups. In addition, the average holdings
of a firm’s largest shareholder are higher for non  -
distressed than for distressed firms.
Table 2 provides country-level summary sta-
tistics for the full sample of firms (Panel A) and
Sengupta and Faccio
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Table 2
Distribution of Responses by Country
Indonesia Malaysia Philippines South Korea Thailand Total
Panel A: Full sample
Number of firms 102 151 69 212 88 622
Response
Creditor workouts 30 27 13 33 33 136
Asset sales 7 42 6 21 15 91
Merger 33 59 4 24
Liquidation 01 27 0 10
Total responses 40 73 26 70 52 261
Ownership structure 
Group affiliation (mean) 0.71 0.58 0.74 0.53 0.50 0.59
Largest blockholder ownership (%) 47.21 30.89 36.76 15.99 39.88 27.40
Panel B: Distressed firms
Number of firms 92 66 56 180 64 458
Response 
Creditor workouts 30 13 11 32 31 117
Asset sales 7 19 6 19 12 63
Merger 22 28 3 17
Liquidation 01 17 09
Total responses 39 35 20 66 46 206
Ownership structure 
Group affiliation (mean) 0.74 0.59 0.73 0.58 0.48 0.62
Largest blockholder ownership (%) 46.65 31.30 36.76 15.97 35.46 26.21
NOTE: Creditor workouts include agreements between a firm and its creditors to modify any terms of outstanding financial claims
currently held against the firm (for both public and private loan agreements). Asset sales include the sales of assets and divestitures in
subsidiaries or divisions to retire debt. Mergers includes firms that merged or were taken over during 1998-2003. Liquidations include
firms liquidated during 1998-2003. A given company may have multiple responses at the same time. See note for Table 1 for additional
definitions.
SOURCE: Data on responses of distressed firms are from the publicly available archives of the IBL website.distressed firms only (Panel B). The number of
firms in each country ranges from 69 in the
Philippines to 212 in South Korea. In the full
sample, there are a total of 261 responses. The
number of firms recording responses was fewer
than 261, however, because a single firm could
have multiple responses. Interestingly, the distri-
bution of each response (as a proportion of total
firms) appears to be evenly spread across the
countries. The sole exception is Malaysia, which
has a disproportionately large number of firms
using asset sales. However, when one conditions
on distressed firms, this difference is no longer
as large. For the full sample, the average largest
blockholder ownership is 27.40 percent. The low-
est average is in South Korea, with a mean of
15.99 percent, and the highest is in Indonesia,
with a mean of 47.21 percent. For the full sample,
59 percent of firms are part of a business group,
with a high of 74 percent in the Philippines and
a low of 48 percent in Thailand. Interestingly, for
distressed firms, group affiliation and largest
blockholder ownership are only marginally dif-
ferent on average than for all firms in the sample.
Table 3 shows the distribution of responses
to distress by year for all firms (Panel A) and
distressed firms only (Panel B). The onset of the
crisis in East Asia was largely during 1997-98.
The majority of responses occurred two to three
years after the crisis. Not surprisingly, responses
peak around the years 2000 and 2001 and decline
thereafter. However, we recorded responses
through 2003 to include those (such as creditor
workouts) that undergo multiple, possibly lengthy
rounds of negotiations to reach an agreement
(see Appendix A for such an example). 
Table 4 shows for the full sample (Panel A)
and distressed firms only (Panel B) the distribu-
tion of the four responses based on firm character-
istics. The columns labeled “1” and “0” indicate
firms with and without responses, respectively.
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Table 3
Distribution of Responses by Year 
Creditor workouts Asset sales Mergers Liquidations Total
Panel A: Full sample
1998 19 15 3037
1999 26 13 6449
2000 42 12 5261
2001 22 24 5354
2002 19 19 4043
2003 881 117
Total 136 91 24 10 261
Panel B: Distressed firms
1998 17 10 3030
1999 26 85443
2000 38 71147
2001 20 20 4347
2002 12 12 3027
2003 461 112
Total 117 63 17 9 206
NOTE: See notes for Tables 1 and 2 for definitions.
SOURCE: Data on responses of distressed firms are from the publicly available archives of the IBL website. Sengupta and Faccio
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Table 4
Summary Statistics by Response Type 
Creditor workouts Mergers Asset sales Liquidations
10101010
Panel A: Full sample
Number of firms 136 486 24 598 91 531 10 612
Firm size (USD thousands) Mean  1,613.64 944.70 1,751.37 1,080.15 1,735.83 1,010.51 2,949.69 1,072.54
Median 393.74 212.37 845.90 229.73 729.54 213.11 326.45 238.95
Group affiliation Percent 61.80 58.23 75 58.36 68.10 57.44 50 59.15
Political connection Percent 18.40 11.93 12.50 13.38 22 11.86 0 13.56
Management ownership Percent 62.20 67.98 79.20 66.22 68.90 66.35 50 67
Pyramid ownership Percent 37.80 31.41 41.70 32.44 36.70 32.14 30 32.84
Firms in group Mean 8.41 10.09 8.69 9.76 10.75 9.50 9.20 9.71
Median 798 89 89 8
Banks in group Mean 2.42 2.72 3.44 2.61 2.81 2.62 2.20 2.66
Median 223 22 21 2
Largest blockholder  Mean 26.91 27.59 29.58 27.29 23.26 28.45 11.68 27.67
ownership
Median 23.55 23.53 26.68 22.71 21.28 23.88 9.72 23.81
Panel B: Distressed firms
Number of firms 117 341 17 441 63 395 9 449
Firm size (USD thousands) Mean  1,535.82 980.26 2,051.38 1,101.91 1,931.58 1,006.39 3,230.57 1,089.89
Median 399.12 255.43 1,151.20 275.59 804.30 255.51 355.13 287.25
Group affiliation Percent 62.39 61.88 76.47 61.45 69.84 60.76 55.56 62.14
Political connection Percent 18.80 8.50 5.88 11.34 17.46 10.13 0 11.36
Management ownership Percent 60.34 64.90 76.47 63.24 59.68 64.38 55.56 63.90
Pyramid ownership Percent 38.79 33.92 47.06 34.70 38.71 34.61 33.33 35.20
Firms in group Mean 8.24 9.47 10 9.11 9.97 9 9.20 9.15
Median 798 89 89 8
Banks in group Mean 2.32 2.69 3.91 2.53 2.95 2.53 2.20 2.60
Median 1.50 23 22 21 2
Largest blockholder  Mean 27.82 25.45 29.34 26.02 22.93 26.86 11.68 26.54
ownership
Median 22.10 21.26 26.24 21.21 20.58 22.01 9.72 22.01
NOTE: The column headings “1” and “0” indicate firms with and without a response, respectively. See notes for Tables 1 and 2 for 
definitions.
SOURCE: Data on responses of distressed firms are from the publicly available archives of the IBL website. In Panel A, firm size (measured as total assets in
USD) is greater for firms with a response than for
those without. The group of firms that responds
with mergers has the highest percentage of firms
with a group affiliation, management ownership,
and pyramid ownership. Firms in this group also
tend to have more banks in their business groups
on average and the largest average largest block-
holder ownership. In contrast, the group of firms
that liquidate has the lowest percentage of firms
with a group affiliation, political connection,
management ownership, and pyramid ownership.
Firms in this group also have the lowest percent-
age of banks in their business groups and the
lowest average largest blockholder ownership.
Panel B has few qualitative differences from
Panel A. Firm size is still larger for firms with a
response than those without. The differences
between the two panels for group affiliation, politi-
cal connection, management ownership, and
pyramid ownership are around 5 percentage
points. One exception is the percentage of firms
with management ownership that use asset sales,
which decreases 9.22 percentage points, from
68.9 percent for the full sample to 59.68 percent
for distressed firms only. 
METHODOLOGY
Our aim is to examine the hazard of corporate
responses to financial distress. To understand the
determinants of a particular event (response), we
estimate a semiparametric hazard regression for
the event. The hazard function ʻ￿t￿ is the (instan-
taneous) probability of the occurrence of the event
at year t and is given by
We assume that the causal processes are different
for each event. Our starting point is the relative
risk model developed in Cox (1972), 
(1)  
where x is a vector of measured covariates and ʲ
is a vector of parameters.14 The hazard ʻ￿t|x￿ gives
the rate of response per unit time period at time t.
λ t
t T t t T t
t t ( ) =







λ λ β t t x x ( ) = ( ) ′ 0 exp￿ ,
This model assumes a baseline hazard, ʻ0￿t￿,
which is identical for all firms in the sample.
The covariates in x influence the overall hazard
for each firm through the exponential term in
equation (1). The baseline hazard is of unspeci-
fied form and, hence, is nonparametric. Along
with the parametric exponential form in equa-
tion (1), we estimate a semiparametric model.
The hazard specification in equation (1) makes it
sufficiently flexible to adapt to our problem of
corporate responses to financial distress.
First, the model allows a firm to make multi-
ple responses even within the same year. More  -
over, the occurrence of one such event does not
preclude others, except in the case of a merger or
liquidation, whereupon the firm exits our sam-
ple.15 We consider three responses to financial
distress: creditor workouts, asset sales, and merg-
ers.16 Liquidations and mergers denote a firm’s
exit from our sample but, given their obvious
differences, we classify them separately. However,
we do not analyze liquidations because few occur
in our sample; thus, their information content is
low and unbiased estimates are unlikely (Hsieh,
Manski, and McFadden, 1985). 
Second, the baseline hazard can be allowed
to vary in specific subsets of data. Typically, such
stratification is useful when some explanatory
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14 The object of interest in a Cox proportional hazard regression model
is the hazard ratio, which can be interpreted as a multiplicative
change in the instantaneous probability of delinquency for a mar-
ginal change in a particular risk characteristic. It seems that the
hazard ratio is analogous to the odds ratio in logistic regressions.
Let ʻ￿t|x￿ be the instantaneous probability of delinquency at year t
conditional on other characteristics given by vector x. We can
define the estimated hazard ratio (HR) for marginal change in risk
characteristic xi as
This gives us 
15 The case of alternative modes of failure, where the occurrence of
a single event removes a bank from risk of the alternative event, is
modeled in Wheelock and Wilson (2000). Our case differs from that
of the competing-risk framework used in their study because in
our study individual firms can have multiple responses to distress.
16 Given the few liquidations, our estimation does not yield any
explanatory power for liquidations per se.
HR t x x x
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effect on the hazard function. We take advantage
of this feature and stratify by country. In doing
so, the population of firms is divided into r strata
and the hazard ʻk￿t|x￿ in the kth stratum depends
on an arbitrary hazard function, ʻ0k￿t￿, and can
be written for k =1,2,…,r as
(2)  
A stratified Cox hazard model allows us to con-
trol for countrywide differences in institutions
(i.e., the rules, practices, and organizations that
govern the economy). Notably, this estimation
technique allows each country to have its own
baseline hazard, ʻ0k￿t￿, k = 1,…r, where r is the
number of countries in our sample. In this respect,
our estimation technique allows us to control for
the evolution of such institutional features over
time. 
Third, the model allows covariates to depend
on time. With such time-varying covariates, x￿t￿,
the relative risk model is of the form
(3)  
for k = 1,2,…,r, where x￿t￿ is the set of covariates.
In our case, financial covariates are time varying
but governance variables are time invariant. We
estimate equation (3) and provide the results
below.
Finally, our estimation procedure allows us
to check for robustness using data for distressed
firms only. Stated differently, we can condition
on financial variables to determine whether a firm
is in distress and only then include it in our regres-
sion sample. Therefore, a firm enters the sample
when, at any year within our sample period, the
financial condition of the firm indicates distress.
Thereafter, the firm remains in our sample unless
it disappears because of a merger or liquidation.
In this way, we try to ensure that the responses
included are only those from distressed firms. It
is important to note that these four generaliza-
tions do not substantially complicate the estima-
tion of the coefficients (see Wheelock and
Wilson, 2000, for details). 
To formalize our estimation procedure, we
describe the methodology as follows. Each firm
λ λ β k k t t x x ( ) = ( ) ′ 0 exp￿ .
λ λ β k k t t t t x x ( ) ( ) = ( ) ( )′
0 exp￿
in the sample is observed at Ji different times, 
ti1 < ti2 < … < tiJi, with either failure (exit due to
merger or liquidation) or censoring occurring at
time tiJi. Here, time refers not to calendar time
but to time relative to the date (year) a firm first
becomes distressed (the entry of the firm into the
sample), so that ti0 = 0, where ti0 is the first date
of distress for the ith firm. Financial data used in
x￿t￿ corresponding to time tij, j = 0,…,￿Ji –1 ￿, are
assumed to reflect the financial position of the
firm i over the interval [tij < ti￿j+1￿￿. Although the
financial data are assumed constant over the given
interval, they may vary across the different inter-
vals, making this estimated model time varying.
In addition, the set of covariates include gover-
nance and ownership variables assumed to be
unchanged throughout the sample period. 
ESTIMATION RESULTS
As mentioned, the literature on corporate
distress includes the study of several financial
variables that are important determinants of
responses to distress. In this section, we include
all relevant financial variables as regressors in
our baseline regression specification. To account
for systematic variations of financial ratios across
industries, we normalize the financial variables
for each financial year using their two-digit SIC
industry mean (Asquith, Gertner, and Scharfstein,
1994). Therefore, all movements of financial
variables in our estimation should be interpreted
as standard deviations (SDs) from their industry
means. In addition to financial variables, we use
different controls for governance, affiliation, and
ownership concentration variables.
The regression results in Tables 5 through 7
report the hazard ratios for the six different spec-
ifications considered in this study. Each specifi-
cation includes the financial variables firm size,
MB ratio, ROE, and interest coverage ratio. Table 5
also includes the intangible asset ratio, which is
an important proxy for asymmetric information
in our regressions for creditor workouts. In addi-
tion, each specification also includes additional
governance variables: Columns 1 and 2 also
include the political connection and group affili-
ation variables, respectively. Columns 3 through
Sengupta and Faccio
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Table 5
Determinants of Creditor Workouts
Stratified Cox hazard ratios: Creditor workouts
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Firm size 0.991 0.987 0.927 0.936 0.917 0.927
(–0.14) (–0.21) (–0.98) (–0.83) (–1.14) (–0.94)
Intangible asset ratio 0.720 0.731 0.586 0.583 0.596 0.586
(–2.98)*** (–2.84)*** (–3.25)*** (–3.10)*** (–3.26)*** (–3.19)***
MB ratio 0.733 0.748 0.850 0.852 0.858 0.862
(–1.46) (–1.35) (–0.68) (–0.64) (–0.65) (–0.64)
ROE 1.097 1.090 1.153 1.137 1.141 1.147
(0.74) (0.65) (1.10) (1.06) (1.05) (1.08)
Interest coverage ratio 0.583 0.583 0.605 0.609 0.592 0.591





Largest blockholder  0.985
ownership (–1.33)
Summed ownership  0.990
concentration (–0.85)
Largest management  0.980
blockholder concentration (–0.92)
Largest nonmanagement  0.994
blockholder concentration (–0.52)
Log pseudo-likelihood –299.11 –298.59 –152.47 –152.80 –152.85 –153.00
Number of firms 452 452 181 181 181 181
Number of responses (events) 71 71 42 42 42 42
Number of observations 2,672 2,672 1,171 1,171 1,171 1,171
NOTE: The intangible asset ratio is the book value of intangible assets divided by the book value of total assets. The MB ratio is the
market value of equity (ordinary and preferred) plus book value of total debt divided by the book value of total assets. ROE is share-
holder net income divided by the year-end book value of shareholder equity (%). The interest coverage ratio is EBIT divided by the
total interest expense. Summed ownership concentration is the sum of all shareholders owning 5 percent or more of the company.
Largest management blockholder concentration indicates the largest blockholder is an officer of the firm (Mitton, 2002). Largest non-
management blockholder concentration  indicates the largest blockholder is not an officer of the firm. See notes for Tables 1 and 2 for
additional definitions. Numbers in parentheses are z-statistics; *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent
levels, respectively. 6 also include the ownership concentration vari-
ables: largest blockholder ownership, summed
ownership concentration, largest management
blockholder, and largest nonmanagement block-
holder concentration, respectively. 
Column 1 of Table 5 reports regression results
for the noted financial variables and the political
connection dummy variable. For the interest
coverage ratio, the point estimate of the regres-
sion coefficient is –0.539 and the hazard ratio—
reported in Table 5—is obtained by exponenti  ating
the coefficient as e−0.539 = 0.583. The negative
coefficient implies that an increase in the interest
coverage ratio from its annual industry (two-digit
SIC) mean significantly reduces the hazard of
creditor workouts. Stated differently, the 0.583
hazard ratio implies that a 1-SD increase in the
interest coverage ratio from its annual SIC two-
digit industry mean reduces the creditor workout
hazard by 41.7 percent. A similar interpretation
can be made for the dummy variable group affili-
ation. As shown in column 2 of Table 5, the point
estimate of the hazard ratio for group affiliation
is 1.580. This means that the creditor workout
hazard for a firm with a business group affiliation
is 1.580 times (58 percent) greater than that for a
firm without a group affiliation.
Creditor Workouts
As shown in Table 5, two of the five financial
variables have significant explanatory power for
the hazard of creditor workouts. A 1-SD increase
in the intangible asset ratio from its industry mean
decreases the hazard of creditor workouts by
0.583 to 0.731 times the hazard of its (industry)
mean value. Arguably, creditors were less likely
to restructure terms of debt for firms with a greater
proportion of intangible assets because there is
greater asymmetry in the information stockholders
and creditors use to value the firm (Gilson, John,
and Lang, 1990). Not surprisingly, a 1-SD increase
in the interest coverage ratio from its industry
mean reduces the hazard of creditor workouts by
0.583 to 0.609 times the hazard of its (industry)
mean value. Clearly, the greater the ability of a
firm to honor its debt payments, the less likely it
will restructure its debt. Notably, however, neither
firm size (total assets), ROE (earning potential),
nor the MB ratio (growth prospects) are significant
determinants of creditor workouts.
Governance variables do have significant
explanatory power for a firm’s decision to restruc-
ture its liabilities during financial distress. Group
affiliation significantly increases the likelihood
of creditor workouts. Firms in a business group
are substantially more likely to undertake creditor
workouts than their unaffiliated peers. Interest  -
ingly, this result provides strong support for the
arguments in Kim (2004). As shown in column 1
of Table 5, firms with a political connection are
1.688 times more likely than firms without a politi-
cal connection to engage in creditor workouts.
Although these results are in line with earlier
studies, such as Faccio, Masulis, and McConnell
(2006), they are not statistically significant in our
sample. We also use two measures of ownership
concentration. Since these measures are expressed
in percentage terms, the variables are scaled by
100. Largest blockholder ownership and summed
ownership concentration each decrease the like-
lihood of creditor workouts, but the results are
not statistically significant in our sample. 
Asset Sales
Not surprisingly, our results in Table 6 also
show that firm size is an important determinant
of asset sales. A 1-SD increase in firm size from its
annual industry (two-digit SIC) mean increases
the hazard of asset sales by 1.466 times the hazard
of its (industry) mean value. Interestingly, how-
ever, other financial variables, such as the prox-
ies for earning potential (ROE), growth prospects
(the MB ratio), and debt repayment capacity (the
interest coverage ratio), seem to adversely affect
the hazard of asset sales. 
Although the effects of these financial vari-
ables are not statistically significant, the gover-
nance variables have significant explanatory
power. The hazard of asset sales for firms with a
group affiliation or political connection is roughly
1.8 times that of firms without such an affiliation
or connection. However, the point estimate for
the group affiliation dummy variable is signifi-
cant at the 10 percent level, whereas that for the
political connection is significant at the 5 percent
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reduces the hazard of asset sales. A 1 percent
increase in largest blockholder ownership reduces
the hazard of asset sales by 0.955 times the hazard
of its (industry) mean value. Perhaps of greater
significance are the differences in the effects of
the largest management blockholder and largest
nonmanagement blockholder variables. While the
former increases the hazard of asset sales, the latter
reduces it. Stated differently, we find that the
decreased hazard of asset sales from high concen-
trations of ownership is largely attributable to large
blockholders not involved with management.
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Mergers
As shown in Table 7, unlike for credit work-
outs and asset sales, ROE has strong explanatory
power for mergers, indicated by the statistically
(and economically) significant point estimate of
the merger hazard ratio for ROE. A 1-SD increase
in ROE from its mean value increases the hazard
of a merger by twice the hazard of its (industry)
mean value. Since mergers tend to occur among
firms with higher operating performance, this
finding seems to indicate that the mergers in
our sample were not necessarily in response to
distress. 
Table 6
Determinants of Asset Sales
Stratified Cox hazard ratios: Asset sales
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Firm size 1.466 1.473 1.428 1.432 1.392 1.464
(6.18)*** (5.36)*** (2.96)*** (2.92)*** (2.46)** (3.09)***
MB ratio 0.961 0.988 0.753 0.751 0.773 0.754
(–0.27) (–0.08) (–1.23) (–1.25) (–1.16) (–1.24)
ROE 1.061 1.030 0.777 0.799 0.817 0.783
(0.29) (0.14) (–1.65)* (–1.56) (–1.38) (–1.60)
Interest coverage ratio 0.764 0.761 0.947 0.889 0.831 0.908





Largest blockholder  0.955
ownership (–2.65)***
Summed ownership  0.982
concentration (–0.72)
Largest management  1.014
blockholder concentration (0.45)
Largest nonmanagement  0.962
blockholder concentration (–2.43)**
Log pseudo-likelihood –160.59 –160.22 –68.90 –71.25 –71.78 –69.68
Number of firms 453 453 181 181 181 181
Number of responses (events) 41 41 20 20 20 20
Number of observations 2,693 2,693 1,176 1,176 1,176 1,176
NOTE: Numbers in parentheses are z-statistics; *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively.
See notes for Tables 1, 2, and 5 for definitions.In addition, some of the governance variables
have strong explanatory power for mergers as
well. For example, the point estimate of group
affiliation is significant at the 10 percent level;
thus, group affiliation significantly increases the
merger hazard. Both ownership concentration
variables also increase the merger hazard by
roughly the same amount. A 1 percent increase
in either the largest blockholder ownership or
the summed ownership concentration increases
the merger hazard roughly by 1.06 times. Import  -
antly, as they do for asset sales, largest manage-
ment blockholder and largest nonmanagement
blockholder have opposite effects. The former
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decreases the merger hazard and the latter
increases it. Here, too, we find that the increase
in the merger hazard from high concentrations of
ownership is largely attributable to large block-
holders not involved with management. 
In summary, we find that financial and gover-
nance variables influence the response hazards
but these effects depend largely on the type of
response. The credit workout hazard decreases
with increases in the intangible assets ratio or
interest coverage ratio. The asset sale hazard
increases with firm size, while the merger hazard
increases with ROE. In addition, the asset sale
hazard decreases but the merger hazard increases
Table 7
Determinants of Mergers
Stratified Cox hazard ratios: Mergers
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Firm size 1.223 1.167 0.896 0.835 0.963 0.813
(2.17)** (1.65)* (–0.83) (–0.85) (–0.45) (–1.60)
MB ratio 0.607 0.563 0.759 0.828 0.424 0.686
(–1.56) (–2.19)** (–0.83) (–0.53) (–1.36) (–1.26)
ROE 1.974 1.998 2.112 2.312 1.963 2.108
(7.88)*** (9.52)*** (4.94)*** (5.04)*** (5.20)*** (5.17)***
Interest coverage ratio 0.523 0.543 0.388 0.306 0.449 0.408





Largest blockholder  1.055
ownership (2.96)***
Summed ownership  1.067
concentration (2.15)**
Largest management  0.934
blockholder concentration (–0.87)
Largest nonmanagement  1.068
blockholder concentration (3.63)***
Log pseudo-likelihood –49.11 –47.40 –25.97 –24.88 –26.95 –24.92
Number of firms 453 453 181 181 181 181
Number of responses (events) 13 13 8888
Number of observations 2,693 2,693 1,176 1,176 1,176 1,176
NOTE: Numbers in parentheses are z-statistics; *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively.
See notes for Tables 1, 2, and 5 for definitions.with higher concentrations of ownership. How  -
ever, both effects are largely attributable to large
blockholders not involved with management.
Finally, political connections and group affiliation
increase all three response hazards. Notably, group
affiliation has the largest effect on the merger
hazard and group affiliation increases the creditor
workout hazard even more. 
ROBUSTNESS CHECK 
Corporate Distress
Our analysis above characterizes corporate
responses to economy-wide distress. In this sec-
tion, we show that the results are robust to the
inclusion of distress at the firm-level only. How  -
ever, there is an important caveat to this analysis.
Since our classification of distressed firms uses
firm-level financial data, the use of such criteria
imposes a selection bias on the regression analy-
sis. It turns out that our earlier results are robust
to this selection bias. 
Based on our definition, we classify 458 firms
as distressed during the sample period (Panel B
of Table 2). Panel B of Tables 2 and 3 show the dis-
tribution of distressed firms and their responses by
country and year, respectively. Not surprisingly,
comparison with the distribution for the full
sample (Panel A of Tables 2 and 3) shows that
most of the responses in the full sample came
from distressed firms. 
Tables 8 to 10 show the determinants of the
three hazards, respectively, for distressed firms
only. In almost all cases, the results are similar to
those for the full sample, which indicates little
loss of generality by conditioning on distressed
firms only.
Our definition of firm-level distress is not
without limitations. First, it is dichotomous and
does not characterize the degree of financial
distress. Therefore, when multiple events are
observed for a single firm, we do not differentiate
between distress levels for each event. Second,
we do not allow firms to switch between the dis-
tressed and nondistressed classifications: Per our
definition, once a firm is classified as distressed
in any given year, it is classified as distressed for
all remaining years in our sample period. To the
extent that our sample of distressed firms includes
firms no longer in distress, our estimates could
be biased.
Country-Level Variation
To control for variations in a country’s insti-
tutions, legal codes, and social patterns of dealing
with economic distress, we use a stratified Cox
hazard model. This model allows the baseline
hazard model to be different for each stratum.
An alternative form of estimation is also used by
using dummy variables for each country. The
results are qualitatively similar and available
upon request.
CONCLUSION
This study examines corporate responses to
economy-wide and firm-level distress. We adopt
a duration analysis framework to study determi-
nants of such responses. We find that financial
and governance variables influence the hazard
of each response but that these effects depend
largely on the type of response. Needless to say,
the scope of this study can be broadened further
to include countries where corporations did not
experience economy-wide distress at the same
time as firm-level distress. This would then pro-
vide us with a counterfactual to determine how
responses to firm-level distress differ between
normal times and times of economy-wide distress.
Broadening the scope of this exercise to different
countries could also allow us to examine how
countrywide differences in legal structures and
bankruptcy codes affect firm-level responses. 
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Table 8
Determinants of Creditor Workouts for Distressed Firms
Stratified Cox hazard ratios: Creditor workouts
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Firm size 0.988 0.988 0.944 0.962 0.940 0.950
(–0.20) (–0.21) (–0.74) (–0.46) (–0.77) (–0.63)
Intangible asset ratio 0.750 0.767 0.619 0.618 0.643 0.624
(–2.55)** (–2.40)** (–2.61)*** (–2.48)** (–2.66)*** (–2.54)**
MB ratio 0.723 0.736 0.864 0.822 0.839 0.864
(–1.29) (–1.20) (–0.43) (–0.53) (–0.50) (–0.43)
ROE 1.140 1.128 1.194 1.162 1.171 1.185
(1.08) (0.95) (1.33) (1.22) (1.22) (1.29)
Interest coverage ratio 0.621 0.624 0.641 0.660 0.623 0.627





Largest blockholder  0.978
ownership (–1.63)
Summed ownership  0.984
concentration (–1.33)
Largest management  0.983
blockholder concentration (–0.76)
Largest nonmanagement  0.989
blockholder concentration (–0.83)
Log pseudo-likelihood –274.87 –275.18 –142.16 –142.55 –143.07 –142.95
Number of firms 404 404 166 166 166 166
Number of responses (events) 66 66 39 39 39 39
Number of observations 1,931 1,931 880 880 880 880
NOTE: Numbers in parentheses are z-statistics; *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively.
See notes for Tables 1, 2, and 5 for definitions.Sengupta and Faccio
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Table 9
Determinants of Asset Sales for Distressed Firms
Stratified Cox hazard ratios: Asset sales
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Firm size 1.453 1.451 1.532 1.579 1.456 1.603
(5.69)*** (5.10)*** (3.18)*** (3.57)*** (2.79)*** (3.47)***
MB ratio 0.978 0.992 0.620 0.603 0.643 0.612
(–0.13) (–0.05) (–1.68)* (–1.65)* (–1.49) (–1.82)*
ROE 1.055 1.021 0.754 0.782 0.809 0.765
(0.24) (0.09) (–1.57) (–1.55) (–1.27) (–1.51)
Interest coverage ratio 0.819 0.824 0.826 0.777 0.692 0.766





Largest blockholder  0.935
ownership (–2.96)***
Summed ownership  0.965
concentration (–1.00)
Largest management  1.019
blockholder concentration (0.61)
Largest nonmanagement  0.944
blockholder concentration (–2.74)***
Log pseudo-likelihood –139.71 –139.21 –56.34 –59.17 –60.63 –57.33
Number of firms 404 404 166 166 166 166
Number of responses (events) 36 36 17 17 17 17
Number of observations 1,944 1,944 882 882 882 882
NOTE: Numbers in parentheses are z-statistics; * and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10 and 1 percent levels, respectively.
See notes for Tables 1, 2, and 5 for definitions.Sengupta and Faccio
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Table 10
Determinants of Mergers for Distressed Firms
Stratified Cox hazard ratios: Mergers
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Firm size 1.169 1.115 0.904 0.842 0.971 0.820
(1.95)* (1.40) (–0.78) (–0.83) (–0.35) (–1.55)
MB ratio 0.643 0.601 0.766 0.871 0.423 0.689
(–1.27) (–1.98)** (–0.81) (–0.39) (–1.31) (–1.30)
ROE 2.026 2.087 2.096 2.319 1.950 2.094
(7.08)*** (9.26)*** (4.81)*** (4.95)*** (5.12)*** (5.06)***
Interest coverage ratio 0.561 0.599 0.390 0.307 0.449 0.410





Largest blockholder  1.055
ownership (2.96)***
Summed ownership  1.069
concentration (2.15)**
Largest management  0.934
blockholder (–0.85)
Largest nonmanagement  1.067
blockholder (3.62)***
Log pseudo-likelihood –45.20 –43.41 –25.81 –24.60 –26.84 –24.78
Number of firms 406 406 166 166 166 166
Number of responses (events) 12 12 88 88
Number of observations 1,944 1,944 882 882 882 882
NOTE: Numbers in parentheses are z-statistics; *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively.
See notes for Tables 1, 2, and 5 for definitions.REFERENCES
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Examples of News Articles from the TCR Asia Pacific Archive from the InterNet Bankruptcy
Library Website17
A.1 Example of a Lengthy Workout Process
WEMBLEY INDUSTRIES: Proposes Debt Restructuring
(TCR Asia Pacific: Thursday, December 16, 1999, Vol. 2, No. 245)
Wembley Industries Holdings Bhd (WIHB) has proposed a debt restructuring exercise involving an issuance of irre-
deemable convertible unsecured loan stocks (Iculs), a rights issue with warrants and an increase in authorized share
capital.
The company said in a statement yesterday the proposed debt restructuring would involve an issuance of RM606mil
nominal value of 1 percent Iculs at 100 percent of its nominal value as full and final settlement of loans owing by WIHB
and two of its subsidiaries Plaza Rakyat Sdn Bhd and Wembley IBAE Sdn Bhd (IBAE) amounting to approximately
RM606mil.
The proposed rights issue would involve 144.475 million new shares and the same number of detachable warrants on
the basis of one new share with one detachable warrant for each existing share held, to be issued at RM1 per new
share. The company’s authorised share capital is proposed to be increased from RM500mil, comprising 500 million
shares, to RM1.5bil.
The proposed debt restructuring involves the restructuring of the secured loans, unsecured loans and amounts owing
to certain creditors of WIHB, Plaza Rakyat and IBAE. Included in the proposed debt restructuring are the loans and
amounts owing by IBAE, a 99.9 percent owned subsidiary of WIHB that is being wound up.
“As WIHB acted as guarantor for the loans of IBAE, the said loans and amounts owing are being restructured together
with WIHB and Plaza Rakyat’s loans owing,” the company said.
As full and final settlement of the loans and amounts owing, Wembley is proposing to issue RM606mil nominal value
of Iculs to the secured and unsecured lenders of WIHB, secured lenders of Plaza Rakyat, unsecured lenders of IBAE
and the major creditors of WIHB, Plaza Rakyat and IBAE. The RM606mil includes the capitalised interest in respect of
the loans, as follows:
• Interest outstanding up to Dec 31, 1998, amounting to RM56mil; and 
• Further interest accruing from Jan 1 to Dec 31, 1999, on the principal amount after adjusting for the capitalisation 
of the outstanding interest set out above at an annual interest rate of 7.25 percent, amounting to RM25mil. 
However, no interest will be capitalised in respect of the amounts owing to the creditors.
The WIHB group’s total debts due to the lenders amounts to RM369mil including interest accrued as of Dec 31, 1998,
and further interest accruing up to Dec 31, 1999, while the amount due to creditors is RM238mil. It said WIHB group’s
current prospects lied mainly in a mixed development project comprising a retail shopping complex, office tower,
hotels and an integrated transport hub housing the central bus terminal and the Light Rail Transit station known as
the Plaza Rakyat project. Plaza Rakyat, the company’s wholly-owned subsidiary, is the sole developer of the project.
“The successful development of the Plaza Rakyat project will depend on the successful deployment of funds towards
the Plaza Rakyat project which, in turn, is dependent on the successful implementation of the proposed debt restruc  -
tur  ing,” it said. (Star Online 15-Dec-1999)
WEMBLEY INDUSTRIES: Workout Scheme Under Revision
(TCR Asia Pacific: Monday, July 9, 2001, Vol. 4, No. 132)
Wembley Industries Holdings Berhad is currently working on a revised proposed debts restructuring scheme and
discussions with the company’s creditors which include financial institutions are still ongoing. However, as the revised
proposed debt restructuring scheme has not been finalized yet, the company could not yet provide details of the
scheme.
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17 Used with permission. The TCR Asia Pacific is co-published by Bankruptcy Creditors’ Services, Inc., and Beard Group, Inc.In a separate announcement, pursuant to Section 5 of PN4, on 2 July 2001, the Company submitted an application to
the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange (KLSE) for an extension of time to obtain all the approvals necessary to implement
its plan to regularize its financial condition.
Background
The Wembley Group’s present focus is the implementation of the Plaza Rakyat project. Following the liquidation and
disposal of several of its principal subsidiaries in 1999 and 2000, the Group’s financial viability hinges on the successful
outcome of its proposed debt restructuring and rights issue, which was announced in December 1999.
Helmed by subsidiary Clifford Investments Ltd, construction works for the development of the Plaza Rakyat project
are currently progressing at a slower pace. The Group is concentrating on the development of the inter-state bus and
taxi terminal, the retail podium and the budget hotel while other components such as the office tower, service apart-
ment and a 4-star hotel have been rescheduled and [are] to be undertaken in the near future.
Interim funding from its corporate proposals would enable the Group to expedite the completion of the terminal,
podium and hotel and subsequently to generate development profit. As of November 2000, approvals from the SC
and Wembley’s shareholders are still pending.
WEMBLEY INDUSTRIES: Proposed Debt Plan Still in Works
(TCR Asia Pacific: Monday, October 8, 2001, Vol. 4, No. 196)
Wembley Industries Holdings Berhad is working on a revised proposed debts restructuring scheme and [is] in dis-
cussions with the Group’s banks/creditors. The details of the proposed debts restructuring scheme have not been final-
ized.
Background
On 2 July 2001, the Company submitted an application to the Exchange pursuant to Section 5 of PN4 for an extension
of time to obtain all the necessary approvals to implement the plan to regularize its financial position. Subsequently,
on 3 August 2001, the Exchange approved the extension of two (2) months from 23 June 2001 to 22 August 2001 to the
Company. In approving the extension, the Company is required, within the extension period, to carry out the following:
(i) revise its regularization plan;
(ii) make a revised requisite announcement to the Exchange;
(iii) submit its revised plan to the regulatory authorities for approval; and
(iv) upon submission of the revised plan to the regulatory authorities, make a separate application to the Exchange 
to seek an additional time for the Company to obtain all the necessary approvals from the authorities.
On 16 August 2001, the Company’s financial adviser, Alliance Merchant Bank Berhad (AMBB), submitted an application
to the Exchange for a further three (3) month extension from 22 August 2001 to 22 November 2001, to carry out the
above requirements. On 21 September 2001, AMBB announced the Exchange had approved the further extension of
time for a period of two (2) months from 23 August 2001 to 22 October 2001 to enable the Company to release the
requisite announcement.
WEMBLEY INDUS.: Creditors OK Revised Debt Restructuring Plan
(TCR Asia Pacific: Wednesday, May 08, 2002, Vol. 5, No. 90)
Wembley Industries Holdings Berhad is an affected listed issuer pursuant to Practice Note No. 4/2001 as the Auditors
of the Company had expressed a disclaimer opinion of the going concern of the Company and its subsidiaries. As an
affected listed issuer, the Company has its obligations under PN4.
On 1 March 2002, Alliance Merchant Bank Berhad, on behalf of the Company announced that the Company was not able
to make the Requisite Announcement by the deadline of 28 February 2002 laid down by the Exchange on 25 January
2002. The Exchange approved an application made to the Exchange on 1 March 2002 for a further extension of time
to 30 April 2002 to make the Requisite Announcement on 18 April 2002. 
An application was made to the Exchange on 26 April 2002 to further extend the date to make the Requisite Announce  -
ment from 30 April 2002 to 30 June 2002. This extension is pending the approval of the Exchange.
STATUS OF PROPOSED RESTRUCTURING
On 14 December 1999, AMBB, on behalf of the Board of Directors of the Company, announced the following:
(i) proposed debt restructuring involving the issue of approximately RM606 million nominal value of 1 percent 
irredeemable unsecured loan stocks (ICULS) at 100 percent of its nominal value as full and final settlement of 
the loans and amounts owning by the Company and its two subsidiaries namely, Plaza Rakyat Sdn. Bhd. and 
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Restructuring);
(ii) proposed rights issue of 144,475,000 new ordinary shares of RM1.00 each together with 144,475,000 detachable 
warrants on the basis of one (1) new ordinary share with one (1) detachable warrant for every one (1) ordinary 
share held at an issue of RM1.00 per new rights share (Proposed Rights Issue); and
(iii) proposed increase in the authorized share capital of the Company from the existing RM500,000,000 comprising 
500,000,000 ordinary shares of RM1.00 each to 1,500,000,000 comprising 1,500,000,000 ordinary shares of RM1.00 each.
Applications were submitted to the Securities Commission (SC) and the Foreign Investment Committee (FIC) on 
16 December 1999. The FIC had on 26 February 2000 approved the Proposed Debt Restructuring subject to the approval
of the SC and that the Bumiputra equity interest in the Company be increased to 30 percent before 31 December 2000.
The Company is expected to seek an extension for the compliance upon receipt of the SC’s approval for the proposals.
The above proposals are pending the approvals of the SC and the shareholders of the Company. Currently, the
Company is working on a revised proposed debt restructuring scheme (Revised Proposed Debt Restructuring) and
is in discussion with the Group’s banks/creditors. As at the date of this announcement, the details of the proposed
debts restructuring scheme have not been finalized yet.
As at to date, five (5) financial institutions, Pengurusan Danaharta Nasional Berhad and two (2) creditors have confirmed
that they are agreeable to the Revised Proposed Debt Restructuring subject to, inter-alia, approvals of other creditors.
The Company has yet to receive the outstanding approval or consent from a major creditor involved in the Revised
Proposed Debt Restructuring.
OTHER MATTERS IN RESPECT OF PRACTICE NOTE N0. 10/2001
On 7 September 2001, the Company announced to the Exchange that the Company is deemed an affected issuer
pursuant to paragraph 2.1(c) of the Practice Note No. 10/2001 (PN10). Under paragraph 2.1(c) of PN10, a listed issuer,
who has an insignificant business or operations, is deemed to have [an] inadequate level of operations. Insignificant
business or operations means business or operations [that generate] revenue on a consolidated basis that represents 5
percent or less of the issued and paid-up share capital of the listed issuer.
As an affected listed issuer under PN10, the Company must comply with the obligations set out in paragraph 6 of PN10.
The Exchange has informed the Company that since the Company is also an affected issuer under PN4, the require-
ments and obligations of PN4 would prevail over those of PN10. It is expected that the Company’s regularization plan
would address both its financial condition (PN4) and the level of operations (PN10) to warrant a continuing listing on
the Official List.
WEMBLEY INDUSTRIES: Finalizes Proposed Debt Restructuring Docs
(TCR Asia Pacific: Wednesday, September 04, 2002, Vol. 5, No. 175)
Wembley Industries Holdings Berhad had on 31 July 2002 via its financial adviser made the Requisite Announcement
pursuant to PN4 to regularize the financial condition of the Company and its subsidiaries.
On 9 August 2002, the Exchange approved the Company’s application dated 31 July 2002 to extend the time from 
1 August 2002 to 30 September 2002 to enable the Company to submit the Proposed Debt Restructuring, the Proposed
Capital Reduction and Consolidation and the Proposed Rights Issue (which were announced on 31 July 2002) to the
relevant authorities.
The Company is currently preparing and finalizing its applications for submission to the relevant authorities.
The Company is also an affected listed issuer under Practice Note 10/2001 (PN10) of the LR. As such, the Company
must comply with the obligations set out in paragraph 6 of PN10. The Exchange has informed the Company that since
the Company is an affected issuer under PN4, the requirements and obligations of PN4 would prevail over those of
PN10. The proposals announced in the Requisite Announcement would enable the Company to address both its
financial condition (PN4) and the level of operations (PN10) to warrant a continuing listing on the Official List.
WEMBLEY INDUSTRIES: FIC Grants Proposals Approval
(TCR Asia Pacific: Wednesday, January 15, 2003, Vol. 6, No. 10)
Further to the announcements dated 30 October 2002, Wembley Industries Holdings Berhad is pleased to announce
that the Foreign Investment Committee has, by its letter dated 7 January 2003, approved the Proposals subject to the
condition that the FIC would review the equity structure of WIHB three (3) years after the completion of the Proposals.
The said letter of approval from the FIC was received on the 10 January 2003.
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i. Proposed Capital Reduction and Consolidation;
ii. Proposed Debt Restructuring;
iii. Proposed Rights Issue; and
iv. Proposed Increase in Authorized Share Capital
A.2 Examples of Workouts
ANAM GROUP: Anam Group’s Workout Details
(TCR Asia Pacific: Monday, November 2, 1998, Vol. 1, No. 177)
The Korean Herald published more details on the restructuring program underway at the Anam Group, the 21st
largest Korean corporation and the world’s largest semiconductor packaging company. Anam, with 25 percent of the
global market share in chip packaging, has reportedly been profitable until last year. 
Three of the group’s affiliates applied for a workout program on October 24th 1998. The three companies are Anam
Semiconductor Company, Anam Electronics Company, and Anam Environment Company. Another arm of Anam, Anam
Construction Company, applied for court receivership. 
Anam is seeking $2.5 billion either from new loans or via the sale of assets. It has already agreed to sell $600 million
in assets (specifically four chip packing plants) to the investors through Solomon Smith Barney and Boston Bank.
This $600 million is earmarked to reduce cross debt guarantees amoung Anam’s subsidiaries and to repay some debts.
KOREA EXPRESS: Court OKs Debt Rescheduling Plan
(TCR Asia Pacific: Thursday, June 14, 2001, Vol. 4, No. 116)
The Seoul District Court has approved the debt rescheduling plan of Korea Express Company, The Asian Wall Street
Journal reported Tuesday. 
The court-approved plan will call for the conversion of the bankrupt logistics company’s debts totaling W271.3 billion
into equity, while other debts amounting to W416.3 billion will be written off by creditor banks.
Moreover, the company will make repayments on debts worth W778.5 billion to creditor banks, the newspaper reports.
GREAT RIVER: Reaches Debt Workout Agreement With Creditors 
(TCR Asia Pacific: Monday, January 14, 2002, Vol. 5, No. 9)
Garment maker PT Great River International Tbk has reached an agreement with its creditors for restructuring of
debts worth US$172.5 million, IndoExchange reports, citing President Director Sunjoto Tanudjaja’s letter to the Jakarta
Stock Exchange (JSX). 
The restructuring will be carried out through a debt-to-equity swap scheme. Part of the debt will be rescheduled for
8 years without any grace period, Tanudjaja added though declined to elaborate the composition of share ownerships
after the restructuring. 
TCR AP reported May last year that it planned to use its assets as collateral in its proposed debt-restructuring program,
which has been signed with the company’s creditors.
A.3 Examples of Asset Sales
APO CEMENT: JG Summit Finalizes Sale of Apo 
(TCR Asia Pacific: Monday, February 22, 1999, Vol. 2, No. 36)
Publicly listed JG Summit Holdings, Inc. sold on Wednesday its entire shareholdings in cement subsidiary, Apo Cement
Corp., to both local and foreign affiliates of Mexico-based Cemex S.A. de CV for $401.5 million.
In a disclosure to the local stock exchange, JG corporate secretary Emmanuel C. Rojas, Jr. said the buyers include
Triple Dime Holdings, Inc., a Philippine-based affiliate of Cemex.
The Gokongwei-owned cement firm, which used to hold 99.9 percent stake in Apo, divested its equity and debt
interests to Triple Dime for $191.5 million.
Sengupta and Faccio
152 MARCH/APRIL 2011 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS REVIEWAnalysts told BusinessWorld yesterday that the company might have been formed by Cemex as an acquisition vehicle
since Philippine laws only allow 40 percent foreign ownership in public utilities.
Meanwhile, the rest of Apo’s loans including its foreign currency denominated-debts worth $210 million were absorbed
by a number of foreign affiliates which the company did not identify. (BusinessWorld 19-Feb-1999)
HYUNDAI ENGIN.& CONST.: Downsizing, Selling Off
(TCR Asia Pacific: Thursday, August 17, 2000, Vol. 3, No. 160)
Hyundai Engineering & Construction (HDEC) is striving to downsize and sell off securities and real estate.
An HDEC official said yesterday that the company is pushing to downsize the organization and realign personnel to
improve efficiency. He said a substantial part of staff in the management department will be moved into [the] sales
department.
The company has 7,000 employees with 250 directors and executives. The downsizing was part of the company’s self-
rescue plan submitted to main creditor Korea Exchange Bank Sunday. HDEC also formed a 15-member executive
committee to carry out its self-rescue plan Monday.
The committee will coordinate repayment of 1.52 trillion won ($1.36 billion) out of the company’s total 6 trillion won
debt by the end of this year and sell a 6.1-percent stake in Hyundai Motor controlled by Hyundai founder Chung 
Ju-yung. HDEC also said it will sell its office building near Kwanghwamun to Hyundai Marine and Fire Insurance for
90 billion won with 18 billion won of that going to pay down debt.
WICAKSANA OVERSEAS: Shareholders OK Jakarana Stake Sale
(TCR Asia Pacific: Tuesday, July 3, 2001, Vol. 4, No. 129)
PT Wicaksana Overseas International Tbk, in its Annual General Meeting on Thursday, approved the 60 percent stake
sale of subsidiary PT Jakarana Tama to Batavia Investment Ltd for US$6.43 million to comply with the company’s debt
restructuring deal with its creditors, AFX reports Thursday.
Deputy Finance Director Elys Karis said the company has not been able to make up for the losses brought about by
the termination of its contract with Batavia Investment.
According to AFX, the company has previously said the termination of the BAT contract will hit earnings in the first half,
with recovery expected in the third and fourth quarters as the company secures new contracts with other producers.
It has projected a net loss of Rp128.6 billion this year and sales of Rp2.341 trillion, against a net loss of Rp201 billion
and sales of Rp2.541 trillion last year.
FIRST PHILIPPINE: Unit Sells 50% Stake in PPC to Claredon
(TCR Asia Pacific: Thursday, July 03, 2003, Vol. 6, No. 130)
In a disclosure to the Philippine Stock Exchange, First Philippine Holdings Corporation power generation unit First
Generation Holdings Corporation sold on June 27 its 50 percent ownership interest in Panay Power Corporation to
Claredon Towers Holdings, Inc. a wholly-owned subsidiary of First Metro Investment Corporation for P1,164,500,000.
PPC owns and operates a 72 MW bunker diesel power plant in Barangay Ingore, Lapaz, Iloilo. Likewise, First Private
Power Corporation which is 40 percent owned by First Gen, sold its 20 percent ownership stake in PPC to Claredon
Towers for P465,800,000.
Panay Electric Company (PECO), the power distribution Company operating in Iloilo, also informed FPHC that it sold
its 30 percent in PPC for P698,700,000 thus completing the acquisition by Claredon Towers of the interest of the share  -
holders of PPC for the total amount of P2,329,000,000. FPHC holds a 30 percent stake in PECO.
A.4 Examples of Mergers and Liquidations
LG IND. SYSTEMS: Two LG Subsidiaries Headed for Merger
(TCR Asia Pacific: Monday, December 14, 1998, Vol. 1, No. 206)
Digital ChosunIlbo reports LG Ind. Systems announced Friday that it has decided to merge with LG Metals to operate
as a single new company from May 1 next year. The merger will increase the paid-in capital of the LG subsidiary up
to W148.1 billion and yearly sales are expected to reach W3.7 trillion. The company will see its electric power systems
and elevator divisions reinforced by the merger, a company official said.
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(TCR Asia Pacific: Monday, January 4, 1999, Vol. 1, No. 1)
The Korea Herald reported details of the steps that Kia Motors Company and its sister bus and truck maker the Asia
Motors Company will take before they are completely taken over by Hyundai Motors Company. The steps will involve
the reduction of Kia’s 37.8 billion won worth of capital by 90 percent prior to a later capital injection that will raise the
company’s capital to 1.5 trillion won. These moves will prepare Kia for Hyundai to amass a 51 percent stake in the
auto maker. 
According to sources in the Korea Stock exchange, old Kia shares will be converted into new shares at a ratio of 10
to 1 (i.e., ten old shares will be equivalent to one new share). Following this, a consortium of five Hyundai affiliated
companies will buy 153 million shares of Kia at a price of 5,500 won per share. This will result in Hyundai having a 51
percent stake in the company. Creditor banks will also convert their debt into a total of 120 million shares (at a rate
of 15,000 won per share) giving them 40 percent of the company. 
Hyundai Motors Company, Korea’s largest automobile manufacturer, was the winner of an international auction of
the bankrupt Kia Motors Company and the Asia Motors Company.
Kia Motors became insolvent last July. Kia Motors and Asia Motors were granted protection from creditors under
court receivership in October 1997. 
MONALISA CO: Completes Liquidation Plan
(TCR Asia Pacific: Tuesday, February 16, 1999, Vol. 2, No. 32)
According to the Korean language Maeil Kyungje’s Business Brief section, the Monalisa Company’s liquidation plan
was approved by the Seoul District Court.
This firm is a major toilet paper and tissue producer in Korea, and filed for court receivership on June 13, 1998. It was
granted receivership on October 8th, 1998.
HANYANG CORP.: Court to Liquidate
WOOSUNG CONSTRUCTION: Court to Liquidate
(TCR Asia Pacific: Thursday, December 7, 2000, Vol. 3, No. 238)
The Seoul District Court has decided to liquidate Hanyang Corp. and Woosung Construction, both of which have
been operating under court supervision.
The two construction firms had been healthy until the end of last year, with Hanyang ranking 18th nationally in terms
of sales and Woosung 37th in 1999. The court said it decided to liquidate the two as both showed little hope of survival.
In the case of Hanyang, its two largest shareholders, state-run firms the Korea National Housing Corp. (KNHC) and
the Korea Asset Management Co. (KAMCO) decided that they would no longer provide operational support and in
the case of Woosung, its debts have continued to snowball since late last year. (Digital Chosun 05-Dec-2000)
AUTOWAYS HOLDINGS: KLESE Removing Securities Trading by Aug 11
(TCR Asia Pacific: Wednesday, July 30, 2003, Vol. 6, No. 149)
Autoways Holdings Berhad (In Liquidation) informed that the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange (KLSE) had written to the
Official Receiver and the Company and advised that they, after having considered all the facts and circumstances of
the matter and upon consultation with the Securities Commission, in the exercise of its powers under paragraph 16.17
of the KLSE’s Listing Requirements has decided to de-list the securities of AUTOWAY from the Official List of the KLSE
as AUTOWAY does not have an adequate level of financial condition to warrant continued listing on the Official List
of the KLSE. 
Accordingly, the securities of AUTOWAY will be removed from the Official List of the KLSE at 9:00 a.m. on Monday,
11 August, 2003. 
The securities of AUTOWAY, which are deposited with the Malaysian Central Depository Sdn. Bhd. (MCD), may remain
deposited with the MCD notwithstanding the de-listing of the securities of AUTOWAY from the Official List of the
KLSE. It is not mandatory for the securities of AUTOWAY to be withdrawn from MCD.
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